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A growing number of jurisdictions treat ‘hardcore’ cartel conduct as crime, in the belief that
the threat of incarceration is necessary for deterrence. The signiﬁcant economic harm
caused by cartels is generally undisputed, but there is disagreement over whether cartel
conduct is morally offensive enough to justify criminalisation. Critics argue that it is
another example of ‘over-criminalisation’, seeking to regulate an activity that is morally
ambiguous. Those in favour have sought to formulate normative justiﬁcations for why cartel
conduct should be crime. Many of these rely on the assumption that members of society
expect markets to be competitive and believe cartels are undesirable. This paper makes a
signiﬁcant contribution by testing this question empirically. Public surveys from the UK,
Germany, Italy and the US are used to critically analyse the extent to which normative
justiﬁcations for cartel conduct have empirical backing.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper makes the ﬁrst empirical contribution to the question of whether cartel
conduct between competing ﬁrms should be subject to criminal sanctions. Cartel
criminalisation has been entirely justiﬁed on deterrence grounds and has not come
about as a result of popular concern at the harmful effects of anti-competitive conduct.
Critics argue that it is an example of the criminal law being misused to prohibit conduct
that is morally ambiguous. Scholars have responded to this by formulating normative
justiﬁcations for cartel criminalisation, which broadly rely on the assumption that
members of society expect markets to be competitive and understand that cartel conduct
is harmful. This contribution tests the robustness of this assumption by analysing the
results of four public surveys carried out in the UK, Germany, Italy and the US.
Cartel conduct refers to anti-competitive arrangements between competing ﬁrms that
restrict or prevent competition. These can involve price ﬁxing, bid-rigging in tendering,
the restriction of output, and the sharing or dividing of customers and geographical
markets. It is generally accepted that such conduct is harmful to consumers and the
wider economy, resulting in less being sold at higher prices than would otherwise be
the case.1 In its most damaging form, cartel conduct does not only have a monetary cost.
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1. See OECD ‘Recommendation of the Council concerning effective action against hard core
cartels’ C(98)35/FINAL (May 1998).
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The combination of higher prices and lower output will mean that many consumers can
no longer afford the product or service in question. As cartels tend to form around
essential goods for which there are few substitutes, this can have a real adverse effect
on individuals’ standard of living.2 Indeed, a recent report by the World Bank has
suggested that if the price of food staples were reduced by 10% through better tackling
of cartels, it could lift 500,000 people in Kenya, South Africa and Zambia out of poverty
and save consumers there US$700 million a year.3 It is hard to accurately estimate the
global cost of cartel behaviour, but just the arrangements that are detected affect
markets worth tens of billions of US dollars4 and these arrangements are thought, on
average, to increase prices by between 16% and 20%.5
Historically, cartels were treated with ambivalence and even encouraged during
periods of economic instability,6 but since the 1950s there has been a growing
recognition of the harm they cause. Today, around 130 jurisdictions have some form
of cartel prohibition, many spurred on by the US, the EU and international bodies such
as the IMF and World Bank.7 Most have followed the EU model of a purely civil or
administrative enforcement regime, in which the only sanction is a corporate ﬁne of
up to 10% of an undertaking’s worldwide turnover. In the EU, these have been
increasing exponentially since the 1990s, with a record ﬁne of €2.93 billion imposed
on ﬁve manufacturers of trucks in July 2016.8 As conﬁrmed by the European Court
2. UNCTAD ‘The impact of cartels on the poor’ (24 July 2013), available at http://unctad.org/
meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/ciclpd24rev1_en.pdf (accessed 20 December 2016).
3. World Bank Breaking Down Barriers: Unlocking Africa’s Potential Through Vigorous
Competition Policy (June 2016), available at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/
243171467232051787/pdf/106717-REVISED-PUBLIC-Africa-Competition-Report-FINAL.
pdf (accessed 20 December 2016), at iii.
4. For example, the US Department of Justice estimated that in the period 1997–2000, just the
international cartels that were detected and prosecuted affected in excess of US$10 billion in US
commerce. Some of these achieved price increases as great as 70% during some periods of their
duration. See JM Grifﬁn, speech at Criminal Practice and Procedure Committee, American Bar
Association Section of Antitrust Law, 49th Annual Spring Meeting, Washington, DC (28 March
2001), available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/criminal-cartel-enforcement-status-
reports (accessed 20 December 2016).
5. JM Connor and Y Bolotova ‘Cartel overcharges: survey and meta-analysis’ (March 2005),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=788884 (accessed 20 December
2016); OECD ‘Hard core cartels – harm and effective sanctions’, Policy Brief (May 2002),
available at http://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/21552797.pdf (accessed 20 December
2016); M Boyer and R Kotchoni ‘The econometrics of cartel overcharges’ (2011) Montreal
Scientiﬁc Series, available at https://www.cirano.qc.ca/pdf/publication/2011s-35.pdf (accessed
20 December 2016).
6. For a discussion of the historical treatment of cartels and the inﬂuence of the US, see C
Harding and J Joshua Regulating Cartels in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd
edn, 2010), ss I, II. Even in the US, the US National Industry Recovery Act 1933 effectively
legalised cartels in the wake of the Great Depression, but has since been shown to have prolonged
economic recovery rather than achieving its stated aim of promoting stability. See HL Cole and
LE Ohanian ‘New Deal policies and the persistence of the Great Depression: a general
equilibrium analysis’ (2004) 112(4) J Pol Econ 779–816.
7. See DD Sokol and A Stephan ‘Prioritizing cartel enforcement in developing world
competition agencies’ in DD Sokol, TK Cheng and I Lianos (eds) Competition Law and
Development (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013).
8. European Commission – press release ‘Antitrust: Commission ﬁnes truck producers €2.93
billion for participating in a cartel’ (19 July 2016) IP/16/2582.
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of Human Rights, cartel ﬁnes are unmistakably punitive in character. Their purpose is to
punish and deter, not to simply regulate the way in which ﬁrms interact with each
other.9 Yet these ﬁnes are imposed directly by the European Commission in a process
that allows it to act as investigator, prosecutor, judge and jury. There is no true
independent adjudication before appeal.10
For many years, the US was the only active criminal cartel enforcement regime in the
world. Cartels were ﬁrst prohibited under the US Sherman Act 1890 and became a
felony in 1974. The US Department of Justice regularly secures convictions of ﬁrms
and individuals – many of whom agree to serve custodial sentences under negotiated
plea agreements11 – from around the world. In the past 20 years, there has been a
movement, internationally, towards the US model. Around 25 jurisdictions have
criminalised ‘hardcore’ cartel conduct, including the UK, France, Ireland and
Australia – with many more having criminal offences that relate only to bid-rigging
in public procurement.12 Most of these have chosen to retain their civil enforcement
powers in parallel, so as to use criminal enforcement selectively. Within the EU, a
divergence has emerged, in that some Member States have adopted criminal offences
while others have chosen to reject them. It appears that the decision to reject
criminalisation has been primarily motivated by practical concerns, rather than worries
relating to legitimacy or questions of morality. Sweden and Finland, for example, both
felt that it would jeopardise the effectiveness of their enforcement regimes by
undermining leniency programmes.13 Although there is clear momentum behind the
cartel criminalisation movement, the actual use of criminal cartel offences outside the
US is still in its infancy, with only a small number of convictions and even fewer
custodial sentences.14
9. See eg J Almunia (Vice President of the European Commission responsible for Competition
Policy) ‘Fighting against cartels: a priority for the present and for the future’, speech, Brussels (3
April 2014), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-281_en.htm
(accessed 20 December 2016); Ofﬁce of Fair Trading (OFT) Cartels and the Competition Act
1998 (2005) OFT435: ‘… not only will members of the cartel be penalised, but a very strong
deterrent message will be sent to other businesses that may be contemplating cartel activity’ (p
10).
10. Stenuit v France [1992] ECC 401, Case C-272/09P; Engel v Netherlands (1979-80) 1
EHRR 647.
11. DI Baker ‘Punishment for cartel participants in the US: a special model?’ in C Beaton-Wells
and A Ezrachi (eds) Criminalising Cartels: Critical Studies of an International Regulatory
Movement (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011).
12. See eg F Wagner-von Papp ‘What if all bid riggers went to prison and nobody noticed?
Criminal antitrust law enforcement in Germany’ in Beaton-Wells and Ezrachi, above n 11.
13. See OECD Annual Report on Competition Policy Developments in Finland (16–18 June
2015), available at http://www.oecd.org/ofﬁcialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?
cote=DAF/COMP/AR(2015)14&docLanguage=En (accessed 20 December 2016). Leniency is
a deﬁning characteristic of modern cartel enforcement. Immunity from ﬁnes is offered to the ﬁrst
ﬁrm to self-report an infringement. Around two thirds of cartels in Europe are uncovered thanks to
this tool.
14. Ireland is probably the most successful of these, although no prosecutions there have yet
resulted in a custodial sentence: T Calvani and KM Carl ‘The Competition Act 2002, ten years
later: lessons from the Irish experience of prosecuting cartels as criminal offences’ (2013) 1(2)
J Antitrust Enforcement 296; also see generally M Furse The Criminal Law of Competition in
the UK and in the US (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012).
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From the information available, it would appear that criminalisation in these
jurisdictions was motivated entirely by deterrence arguments and the prevention
of economic harm;15 in particular, the desire to impose effective punishment on
individuals, in addition to corporate ﬁnes against the ﬁrm. For example, in the
UK it was thought that ‘the threat of a criminal conviction and the possibility
of a prison sentence means that individuals are more likely to think very carefully
before engaging in cartels’.16 This was later supported by an empirical study for
the Ofﬁce of Fair Trading (OFT) in 2010 (now the Competition and Markets
Authority, or CMA), which found that the deterrent effect of threatened criminal
penalties was signiﬁcantly greater than ﬁnes.17 In Ireland18 and Australia19 too,
criminalisation was driven by deterrence arguments that civil penalties were not
strong enough to deter and did not impact sufﬁciently on individual decision
makers responsible for cartel arrangements. As if to endorse this justiﬁcation,
when Ireland received a ‘Programme of Financial support’ from the EU and the
IMF in 2010, in the wake of the ﬁnancial crisis, it included a requirement that
ﬁnes and other competition law sanctions be reformed ‘to generate more credible
deterrence’.20 This resulted in the Irish government doubling their maximum
sentence to 10 years under the Competition [Amendment] Act 2012. There is
no evidence to suggest that cartel criminalisation is being driven by any kind of
surge in popular outrage or moral opprobrium associated with the act of forming
a cartel. Indeed, even in the US, where arguably there was popular support for the
Sherman Act, cartel laws have not historically been seen as ‘crimes of moral
turpitude’.21 Competition authorities do occasionally draw vague parallels between
15. See A Stephan ‘How dishonesty killed the cartel offence’ (2011) 6 Crim L Rev 446–455.
16. Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) White Paper A World Class Competition Regime
(CM 5233) 2001, para 7.33; see also Joint Treasury/DTI Report The UK’s Competition Regime
(2001); OFT ‘Proposed criminalization of cartels in the UK’, a report prepared for the OFT by
Sir Anthony Hammond KCB QC and Roy Penrose OBE QPM (November 2001) 1.4.
17. OFT Drivers of Compliance and Non-compliance with Competition Law: An OFT Report
(May 2010) OFT 1227.
18. Criminal sanctions were introduced by the Competition Act 1996, with important reforms
made under the Competition Act 2002. For a discussion of why Ireland criminalised and the
background, see P Massey and JD Cooke ‘Competition offences in Ireland: the regime and its
results’ in Beaton-Wells and Ezrachi, above n 11, ch 5.
19. This was originally recommended by the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission: ACCC ‘Submission to the Trade Practices Act Review (Public Submission No
50, 2002) 35. It persuaded the Dawson Committee to recommend criminalisation: Trade Practices
Act Review Committee Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act
(Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, report dated 31 January 2003, released 16 April
2003). For discussion, see C Beaton-Wells and B Fisse ‘Criminalising serious cartel conduct:
issues of law and policy’ (2008) 36 Austral Bus L Rev 166.
20. EU/IMF Programme of Financial Support for Ireland (16 December 2010); A Stephan
‘Will IMF requirement that Ireland strengthen competition law sanctions actually make a
difference? Competition Policy Blog (31 October 2011), available at https://competitionpolicy.
wordpress.com/ (accessed 20 December 2016).
21. J Flynn ‘Criminal sanctions under state and federal antitrust laws’ (1967) 45 Tex L Rev
1301 at 1315, discussed by GJ Werden ‘Sanctioning cartel activity: let the punishment ﬁt the
crime’ (2009) 5(1) Eur Competition J 19.
4 Legal Studies
© 2017 The Authors Legal Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Society of Legal Scholars
cartel conduct and theft or fraud, but these largely arise in the context of public
relations and occur regardless of whether the enforcement process is criminal or
civil.22
The deterrence argument at the heart of cartel criminalisation is generally drawn from
modern economic theory.23 It assumes that businesses make rational choices about
whether to break the law and will only engage in cartel behaviour where it is proﬁtable
to do so. It is thought that corporate ﬁnes alone cannot achieve this. The problem is that
ﬁnes are typically imposed on undertakings some years after the cartel was formed and
are unlikely to directly impact on the individuals responsible.24 It is also questionable
whether ﬁnes are capable of outweighing illegal cartel proﬁts without making ﬁrms
insolvent.25 To illustrate this point, between January 2006 and December 2015, the
European Commission imposed ﬁnes averaging around 2.2% of infringing ﬁrms’
annual worldwide turnover.26 Yet empirical estimates of average overcharges achieved
by cartels range from 16% to 20% and are thought to be as high as 60% for some
international cartels.27 In addition, this does not allow for the fact that cartels average
around 7 years in duration and that the rate of detection may be as low as 13% of cartels
22. Examples of this include Klein’s famous observation that cartels amount to ‘theft by well
dressed thieves’; JI Klein ‘The war against international cartels: lessons from the battlefront’,
speech at Fordham Corporate Law Institute (14 October 1999); and the New York and the US
Supreme Court’s description of cartels as ‘the supreme evil of Antitrust’ Verizon Communications
v Law Ofﬁces of Curtis v Trinko (2004) 540 US 398, 408. Some have noted an assumption by the
ACCC that members of the public saw cartels as equivalent to theft, although there was no clear
evidence of this at the time. See C Beaton-Wells and C Parker ‘Justifying criminal sanctions for
cartel conduct: a hard case’ (2013) 1(1) J Antitrust Enforcement 198; C Beaton-Wells and F
Haines ‘Making cartel conduct criminal: a case study of ambiguity in controlling business
behaviour’ (2009) 42(2) Austral & NZ J Crim 218.
23. The economic paradigm of deterrence was expressed in the seminal article: G Becker
‘Crime and punishment: an economic approach’ (1968) 76 J Pol Econ 169.
24. OECD Cartels: Sanctions Against Individuals (Paris: OECD Competition Committee,
2003).
25. A Stephan ‘The bankruptcy wildcard in cartel cases’ (August 2006) J Bus L 511–534.
26. This ﬁgure includes immunity applicants, whose ﬁne was zero, but who nevertheless were
involved in the cartel and were subject to an infringement decision. The data is taken from
statistics published on the website of the European Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf (accessed 20 December 2016).
27. JM Connor and RH Lande ‘Cartel overcharges and optimal cartel ﬁnes’ in Issues in
Competition Law and Policy vol 3 (Chicago: ABA Section of Antitrust Law, 2008) ch 88, pp
2203–2218; JM Connor ‘Price ﬁxing overcharges: revised 3rd edition’, unpublished manuscript
(February 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2400780
(accessed 20 December 2016); F Smuda ‘Cartel overcharges and the deterrent effect of EU
competition law’ ZEW Discussion Paper no 12-050 (July 2012), available at ftp://ftp.zew.de/
pub/zew-docs/dp/dp12050.pdf (accessed 20 December 2016); Y Bolotova ‘Cartel overcharges:
an empirical analysis’ (2006) unpublished manuscript, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=931211 (accessed 20 December 2016); Y Bolotova, JM Connor and
DJ Miller ‘Factors inﬂuencing the magnitude of cartel overcharges: an empirical analysis of
the US market’ (2009) 5(2) J Competition L & Econ 361–381; M Boyer and R Kotchoni
‘Howmuch do cartels overcharge?’ (2015) 47(2) Rev Industrial Org 119–153; OECDHard Core
Cartels (Paris: OECD, 2000), available at http://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/2752129.pdf
(accessed 20 December 2016).
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formed.28 Under deterrence theory, ﬁnes would need to be multiplied to compensate for
these factors. As civil ﬁnes imposed on individuals can be indemniﬁed by the ﬁrm or
taken into account when weighing up the potential beneﬁts and costs of colluding, it
is thought that only the threat of gaol can pose a truly deterrent effect.
Against this backdrop, a lively debate has emerged on whether it is justiﬁable for
‘hardcore’ cartel conduct to be treated as crime. While few would dispute the social
harm caused by cartels, the deterrence arguments outlined above do not address the
question of whether cartel conduct is of sufﬁcient moral opprobrium to be treated as
crime. Drawing on the wider literature on ‘over-criminalisation’,29 Jones and Williams
point to the morally ambiguous nature of cartel conduct and the lack of any bottom-up
moral outrage, to argue that it is not crime.30 They contend that reliance only on
deterrence and the prevention of harm as a justiﬁcation for criminalisation may risk
creating a ‘morally-neutral criminal offence’.31
Conscious of these legitimate criticisms and shortcomings, a number of scholars
have sought to formulate normative justiﬁcations for cartel criminalisation that do
not rely on a deterrence theory. These focus on delinquency and the cheating or
subversion of the competitive process. In particular, Wardhaugh32 characterises cartels
as attacking a valuable institution in liberal society (the market), while Whelan33
employs retribution theory to argue that cartel conduct can be conceptualised as theft
or deception. However, arguments that cartels are inherently immoral, generally rely
on the assumption (up to now untested empirically) that members of society expect
markets to be competitive and understand that cartel conduct is harmful.
This paper ﬁlls this important gap in this literature by making the ﬁrst empirical
contribution to the cartel criminalisation debate. It analyses the results of public
surveys carried out in the UK, Germany, Italy and the US, to determine: (i) whether
ordinary members of the public expect prices charged by competing ﬁrms to be
calculated independently of each other (a competitive norm); and (ii) the extent to
which cartel conduct is viewed as objectionable by ordinary members of the public
(a moral stigma). The results help us determine whether the central assumption made
in the normative justiﬁcations for cartel criminalisation holds true, and the broader
extent to which ordinary members of the public view cartel conduct as morally
offensive enough to support criminalisation. In pursuit of these goals, section 1 sets
28. There are a number of studies that concur estimates in this region: PG Bryant and EW
Eckard ‘Price ﬁxing: the probability of getting caught’ (1991) 73(3) Rev Econ & Stat 429–
445; E Combe and C Monnier ‘Fines against hard core cartels in Europe: the myth of over
enforcement’ (2011) 56 Antitrust Bull 235; PL Ormosi ‘A tip of the iceberg? The probability
of catching cartels’ (2014) 29(4) J Appl Econometrics 549–566. This is not an exhaustive list.
29. AJAshworth ‘Is the criminal law a lost cause? (2000) 116 LQRev 225; AJ Ashworth and L
Zedner ‘Defending the criminal law: reﬂections on the changing character of crime, procedure
and sanctions’ (2008) 2 Crim L & Phil 21; D Husak Overcriminalization and the Limits of
Criminal Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
30. A Jones and R Williams ‘The UK response to the global effort against cartels: is
criminalization really the solution?’ (2014) 2(1) J Antitrust Enforcement 100–125 at 102.
31. See discussion in P Whelan ‘Cartel criminalization and the challenge of “moral
wrongfulness”’ (2013) 33(3) Oxford J Legal Stud 535–561 at 541; and P Whelan ‘Morality
and its restraining inﬂuence on European antitrust criminalisation’ [2009] TCLR 40.
32. B Wardhaugh ‘a normative approach to the criminalisation of cartel activity’ (2012) 32
Legal Stud 369.
33. P Whelan The Criminalization of European Cartel Enforcement: Theoretical, Legal and
Practical Challenges (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
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out the main objections to extending the criminal law to cartel conduct, then section 2
identiﬁes the main normative justiﬁcations that do not rely on deterrence arguments.
The results of the survey are presented and interpreted in section 3, and the paper
ends with concluding remarks.
The paper ﬁnds strong evidence to suggest that there is an assumption of competition
between ﬁrms, and that most ordinary people understand that cartel conduct is harmful
and should be punished. However, there is only weak support for imprisonment and
perceptions of cartel wrongfulness are comparatively weak next to other forms of
wrongdoing. These ﬁndings strengthen the case for cartel criminalisation, but also
highlight the need for greater public awareness of competition law.
1. OBJECTIONS TO CARTEL BEHAVIOUR BEING TREATED AS CRIME
The question examined in this paper is not unique to competition law. There is a
broader, long-standing debate among criminal lawyers over what categories of
wrongdoing should rightly be treated as crime and the criteria against which they should
be judged. The criticism of ‘over-criminalisation’ is largely directed at regulatory
offences – those perceived as seeking to control conduct that lacks the moral
condemnation purportedly inherent in crime. Green summarises the arguments of those
concerned about over-criminalisation, as follows:
… applying criminal sanctions to morally neutral conduct is both unjust and
counterproductive. It unfairly brands defendants as criminals, weakens the moral
authority of the sanction, and ultimately renders the penalty ineffective. It also
squanders scarce enforcement resources and invites selective and potentially
discriminatory prosecution. We should reserve the criminal law – ‘heavy artillery’
of our legal system … – for conduct that reﬂects the traditional conception of
criminality.34
These arguments have gained momentum in the UK in recent years, with the massive
increase in the number of criminal offences adopted since the 1990s, which are aimed
at regulating the behaviour of individuals and the ﬁrm.35 This regulation by criminal
law, as some see it, is said to contribute to ‘a signiﬁcant blurring of the line between civil
and criminal law’ and has ‘resulted both in the overuse of criminal law, outside of its
traditional context, and its under enforcement’.36 One problem is that criminalisation
is used as a ‘quick political ﬁx’where governments want to be seen to be taking an issue
34. S Green ‘Why it’s a crime to tear a tag off a mattress: overcriminalization and the moral
content of regulatory offences’ (1997) 46 Emory L J 1535 at 1536, citing FA Allen ‘The morality
of means: three problems in criminal sanctions’ (1981) 42 U Pitt L Rev 737 at 738; and FB Sayre
‘Public welfare offenses’ (1933) 3(55) Colum L Rev 79–80. See also the difﬁculties associated
with analysing criminalisation, discussed in N Lacey ‘Historicising criminalisation: conceptual
and empirical issues’ (2009) 72(6) Mod L Rev 936–960.
35. ‘Blair’s “frenzied law making”: a new offence for every day spent in ofﬁce’ The
Independent 15 August 2006; for an empirical study of criminalization during this period, see
J Chalmers and F Leverick ‘Tracking the creation of criminal offences’ (2013) Crim L Rev
543–560.
36. Jones and Williams, above n 30, p 108.
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seriously, even though the non-criminal enforcement powers necessary to deal with the
issue already exist.37
Jones and Williams aim a version of these arguments squarely at cartel
criminalisation. They argue that the use of criminal law ‘as a form of preference-
shaping disincentive to deter violations of anti-cartel rules… does not consider whether
there are any inherent differences between criminal and civil law which might prevent
them appearing simply as different points on a continuous spectrum’.38 Drawing on the
wider literature described above, they suggest there is something ‘special’ about the
criminal law in that ‘it signals moral condemnation of the criminalized conduct’ and
that ‘It is not clear how the [cartel offence] reﬂects or builds moral stigma of prohibited
conduct’.39
However, the debate on criminalisation (in the common law world at least) is skewed
by the difﬁculties inherent in providing clear distinctions between criminal and civil
wrongdoing. Sets of descriptive criteria can be misleading. For example, although a
mens rea requirement (a guilty mind) is generally necessary in criminal law and can
be viewed as an expression of moral culpability, there are increasing instances of strict
liability offences, which require only a guilty act.40 As mentioned in the introduction, in
competition law it is difﬁcult to discern a difference in the function of civil and criminal
sanctions in relation to cartels, and it is notable that the standard of proof in civil
‘hardcore’ cartel cases is closer to the criminal standard than to the traditional civil
balance of probabilities.41
Those critical of widening criminalisation accept that civil and criminal law can be
viewed as part of the same spectrum of policy tools available to regulate behaviour.42
However, they point to the question raised by Robinson: if criminal and civil law should
be viewed in this way, why do legal systems still treat them as two distinct branches of
enforcement?43 He suggests that this is because criminal liability ‘signals moral
condemnation of the offender’ by creating a speciﬁc criminal label that has a special
condemnatory meaning. In doing so, the system communicates a clear condemnatory
message. This is why, Jones and Williams reason,
37. See eg R White ‘Civil penalties: oxymoron, chimera and stealth sanction’ (2010) 126 L Q
Rev 593.
38. A Jones and R Williams ‘The UK response to the global effort against cartels: is
criminalization really the solution?’ (2014) 2(1) J Antitrust Enforcement 100–125 at 102.
39. Ibid; for examples, see A Ashworth ‘Conceptions of overcriminalization’ (2008) 5 Ohio St
J Crim L 407–425 at 407–409; H Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1968) p 359; F Sayre ‘Public welfare offences’ (1933) 33 Colum L Rev 55.
40. See J Coffee ‘Does “unlawful”mean “criminal”? Reﬂections on the disappearing tort/crime
distinction in American law’ (1991) 71 Boston U L Rev 193; discussed in Jones and Williams,
above n 30, p 109; see also Ashworth and Zedner, above n 29.
41. See Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings Ltd and Subsidiaries v Director General of Fair
Trading, [2002] CAT 1 and JJB Sports PLC v Ofﬁce of Fair Trading, [2004] CAT 17. In these
cases, the Competition Appeals Tribunal stated that the level of strong and compelling evidence
must take into account the seriousness of the alleged conduct, ensuring that the undertaking’s
presumption of innocence is respected, as well as any reasonable doubt that may exist.
42. D Friedman ‘Beyond the tort/crime distinction’ (1996) 76 Buffalo U L Rev 103 at 110; S
Shavell ‘Criminal law and the optimal use of nonmonetary sanctions as a deterrent’ (1985) 85
Colum L Rev 1232 at 1235; and R Posner ‘An economic theory of the criminal law’ (1985)
Colum L Rev 1193.
43. P Robinson ‘The criminal–civil distinction and the utility of desert’ (1996) 76 Boston U L
Rev 201 at 203.
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… criminal law should not be utilized simply as a mechanism for creating deterrence
without addressing the issue of moral stigma. If criminal law is to have an educative
role, it must make clear what is morally reprehensible about the activity in question.44
Jones and Williams point to the fact the UK’s cartel offence, under s 188 of the
Enterprise Act 2002, was meant to ‘send out a strong message to the perpetrators, their
colleagues in business, the general public and the courts’.45 As part of the drive to
bolster deterrence through criminalisation, the UK offence was in part aimed at
hardening perceptions of cartels. The act of criminalising and the adoption of the
standard of dishonesty (borrowed from the law of theft and fraud) would, it was thought,
signal the seriousness of cartel practices.46 Yet, only ﬁve individuals have been
convicted since the cartel offence was adopted 13 years ago. Moreover, the requirement
of dishonesty – the moral element of the offence –was dropped by s 47 of the Enterprise
and Regulatory Reform Act 2013. The government felt that the dishonesty element was
hindering its enforceability because many jurors might not view cartel conduct as
dishonest.47
The central shortcoming of the dishonesty requirement was that it was intended to
harden attitudes towards cartels, but depended on the jury being satisﬁed that the
conduct was, by contemporary standards, objectively dishonest and that the defendant
must have known their conduct was dishonest by those standards.48 It was thought that
dishonesty would be obvious from the actions of those responsible, but the OFT found it
difﬁcult to present evidence in a manner that demonstrated this. In R v Dean and
Stringer, two defendants who did not dispute the facts of the case but simply argued that
their conduct was not dishonest were acquitted by a jury in less than 2 hours.49 This was
despite the fact that evidence was presented to suggest that the conduct was actively
hidden from customers and that it resulted in margins increasing signiﬁcantly.50 The
case may have been an example of jury nulliﬁcation, in that they simply did not accept
that the conduct was crime – something that would support Jones and Williams’
arguments. However, there were signiﬁcant shortcomings to the prosecution’s case
(in particular, it is unclear whether the jury fully understood the alleged conduct) and
juries in both Ireland and theUS have beenwilling to convict cartel conduct in the past.51
44. Jones and Williams, above n 30, p 113.
45. Patricia Hewitt, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. Hansard HC Deb, vol 383, col
48, 10 April 2002.
46. Hammond and Penrose, above n 16, at 7.3; See alsoMFurse and SNash The Cartel Offence
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004) at 3.6–3.7; and Stephan, above n 15.
47. Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) A Competition Regime for Growth: A
Consultation on Options for Reform (London: BIS, March 2011); BIS Growth, Competition and
the Competition Regime: Government Response to Consultation (London: BIS, March 2012) p
1011.
48. R v Ghosh [1982] EWCA Crim 2. See Stephan, above n 15; P Whelan ‘Improving criminal
cartel enforcement in the UK: the case for the adoption of BIS’s “Option 4”’ (2012) 8(3) Eur
Competition J 589; A MacCulloch ‘The cartel offence: deﬁning an appropriate “moral space”’
(2012) 8(1) Eur Competition J 73–93.
49. R v Dean and Stringer (2015) Southwark Crown Court, unreported. See also Competition
and Markets Authority, CMA statement following completion of criminal cartel prosecution (24
June 2015).
50. The case is unreported, but this author acted as an expert advisor to the defence team of
Clive Dean and sat through the entire trial.
51. There are numerous examples in the US. In Ireland, the ﬁrst instance of a jury conviction for
cartel conduct was in DPP v Hegarty [2013] IECCA 66.
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Controversially, dishonesty was not replaced with anothermens rea standard beyond
intention. Those critical of the reform argued that it widened the scope of the offence
beyond conduct that was clearly dishonest and therefore risked capturing legitimate
business practices.52 To deal with these concerns, a series of carve-outs and defences
where introduced, which allow defendants to escape criminal liability where they can
demonstrate they did not enter (or did not intend to enter) into the arrangements
openly.53 It can be argued that deliberately clandestine acts show that defendants knew
they were engaging in wrongdoing and therefore acting immorally, yet this does not
address the question of whether the conduct itself was immoral.54 The new offence
signiﬁcantly lowers the bar for proving liability, and the apparent circumventing of
the offence’s moral marker can be seen as vindicating Jones and Williams’ contention
that the offence is ineffective and that ‘its existence might damage the condemnatory
force of the criminal law more generally’.55
Cartel criminalisation in the UK did not result from bottom-up moral outrage at the
harmful effects and delinquent nature of cartel conduct. Instead, it was a top-down
policy, reﬂecting the general willingness by the UK government to use a wide range
of policy tools in regulatory control, including criminal ones.56 The same could be said
about cartel criminalisation in other jurisdictions, as discussed above. Goodwin points
out that for the law to serve a social function and guide their behaviour, people must
have ‘some good way of ﬁnding out what the law actually requires of them’ and that
there is something fundamentally ﬂawed in the criminal law informing the public of
what constitutes a crime rather than the other way around.57 Williams suggests that a
forward-looking offence is ﬂawed because ‘the law cannot pull itself up by its own
bootstraps in this way, any attempt to do so risks damaging both the process of cartel
criminalisation and the criminal law more generally’.58
A central tenet of the over-criminalisation argument is that harm alone does not
provide an automatic justiﬁcation for the use of criminal law. It is harm that underpins
the deterrence arguments that motivate cartel criminalisation, as described in the
introduction. Even some academics who broadly support criminalisation accept that
deterrence theory is too simplistic and ignores ‘the complex normative and social
contexts in which cartel behaviour and enforcement occur’.59 The over-criminalisation
scholars contend that the key to the use of criminal law is its ability to signal society’s
moral condemnation of the harmful behaviour. This depends on both harm and moral
culpability: in other words, both a guilty act and a guilty mind. Some go as far as to
52. See eg Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Public Bill Committee June 19, 2012, col 7 and
10 July 2012, col 540.
53. A Stephan ‘The UK cartel offence: a purposive interpretation?’ (2013) Crim L Rev 879–
892; P Whelan ‘Section 47 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013: a ﬂawed reform
of the UK cartel offence’ (2015) 78(3) Mod L Rev 493–521.
54. Whelan, above n 48.
55. Jones and Williams, above n 30, p 108.
56. See Law Commission Consultation Report 195 ‘Criminal liability in regulatory contexts: a
consultation paper’ (2010).
57. RE Goodin ‘An epistemic case for legal moralism’ (2010) 30(4) Oxford J Legal Stud 615–
633.
58. RWilliams ‘Cartels in the criminal landscape’ in Beaton-Wells and Ezrachi, above n 11, pp
295–298.
59. C Parker ‘Criminalisation and compliance: the gap between rhetoric and reality’ in Beaton-
Wells and Ezrachi, above n 11.
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suggest that moral culpability is more signiﬁcant than harm.60 Jones and Williams say
that ‘in order to generate moral stigma, therefore, it would seem to be crucial for it to be
identiﬁed with sufﬁcient clarify what is morally reprehensible about cartel conduct; and
what features of such activity distinguish it from other anti-competitive conduct that is
not criminalised’.61 They suggest that when cartels were criminalised in the UK, they
were not perceived as being morally wrong.62
This contention appears to be supported by the historically tolerant treatment of cartel
arrangements in common law.63 These were expressed as recently as 2007, in the case
of Norris v USA, when the House of Lords ruled on whether a British national could be
extradited to the US to face price-ﬁxing charges on the basis that cartel conduct
amounted to the common law crime of conspiracy to defraud. In allowing Norris’
appeal to dismiss the extradition, the House of Lords found, ‘… unless there were
aggravating features such as fraud, misrepresentation, violence, intimidation or
inducement of a breach of contract, cartel agreements were not actionable or
indictable’.64 They overturned the Divisional Court’s decision, which accepted an
argument made in an academic article by Lever and Pike, that ‘In many situations today
third parties who deal with undertakings that are in fact parties to cartel agreements will
proceed on the assumption that they are dealing with undertakings that are lawfully
engaged in normal competition with each other’.65
One might also point to inconsistencies in how cartels are treated in law. For
example, many competition law regimes do not apply to certain industries, such as
agriculture and public utilities.66 They are also deliberately designed to apply to
domestic markets only, meaning that it is lawful for ﬁrms to enter into export cartels.
Thus behaviour, treated as crime domestically, is perfectly permissible (and sometimes
even encouraged) when it is directed at foreign markets.67 However, exclusions of this
nature are not unusual even in the most unequivocally severe forms of wrongdoing. In
homicide, for example, we recognise the concept of a ‘lawful killing’.
So the key criticisms of cartel criminalisation can be summarised as follows: (i) that it
seeks to signal the seriousness of cartel conduct and does not make clear what is morally
reprehensible about it; and (ii) that there is no clear evidence of society’s moral
condemnation of cartel conduct, or even an awareness that such conduct is harmful.
For these reasons, cartel offences may be viewed as lacking legitimacy and as damaging
60. See eg A Ashworth ‘Criminal attempts and the role of resulting harm under the code, and in
the common law’ (1987–1988) 19 Rutgers L J 725 at 742.
61. Jones and Williams, above n 30, p 116.
62. Ibid, p 113.
63. See eg Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Australia v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd
[1913] AC 781; Mogul Steamship Co Ltd v McGregor, Gow & Co (1888) 21 QBD 544; (1889)
23; QBD 598 (CA); [1892] AC 25; Jones v North (1875) LR 19 Eq, 426, 429.
64. Norris v Government of the United States of America and others [2008] UKHL 16 at 60.
65. J Lever and J Pike ‘Cartel agreements, criminal conspiracy and the statutory ‘cartel
offence’: parts I and II’ (2005) 26(2) Eur Competition L Rev 90 at 95; Norris v Government of
the United States of America and others [2007] EWHC 71 at 54 and 64; also discussed by
Whelan, above n 33, p 103.
66. See GC AllenMonopoly and Restrictive Practices (London: George Allen &Unwin, 1968)
p 135, discussed in Harding and Joshua, above n 6, p 51.
67. M Martyniszyn ‘Export cartels: is it legal to target your neighbour? Analysis in light of
recent case law’ (2012) 15(1) J Int’l Econ L181–222.
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all criminal law. We now turn to the normative arguments in favour of cartel
criminalisation.
2. NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CARTEL CRIMINALISATION
The arguments discussed in the previous section are to some extent ﬂawed, because the
greatest economic harm in the modern world comes not from traditional property
offences such as theft or fraud, but from sophisticated forms of corporate wrongdoing
that are largely hidden. Even when uncovered, many of these (including cartel conduct)
can be complex and do not usually produce the necessary critical mass of harm needed
to attract widespread media coverage or cause public outrage – yet they must be dealt
with effectively all the same. The arguments have also failed to convince policy makers,
who appear content with deterrence and the prevention of social harm, as sufﬁcient
justiﬁcations for cartel criminalisation. Nonetheless, ﬁnding a convincing response to
these arguments may be important to the long-term success of cartel criminalisation.68
Indeed, the deterrence arguments largely relied upon by its proponents have some
serious shortcomings. They generally rely on the economic paradigm of deterrence,
which assumes that wrongdoers make rational choices about whether to engage in
wrongdoing, weighing up the expected costs and beneﬁts of doing so.69 As explained
in the introduction, it is thought that only the threat of a custodial sentence can achieve a
meaningful level of deterrence, because ﬁnes are unlikely to outweigh the potential
cartel proﬁts earned. However, the extent to which cartelists can be said to behave
rationally is questionable.70
Whelan identiﬁes three criticisms of modern deterrence theories. These are that: (i) it
is difﬁcult to quantify, with any accuracy, what a deterrent penalty should look like
(especially as cartel prohibitions do not generally engage in any analysis of effects);
(ii) strict adherence to deterrence theory would lead to unfair and disproportionate
outcomes (eg imposing enormous punishment on a small violation because of
perceived weaknesses in the rate of detection); and (iii) even if penalties were in some
way ‘optimal’, the assumptions of rational decision making and the availability of
accurate information about punishment and likelihood of detection are very doubtful.
In particular, an empirical study conducted by the University of Melbourne, involving
68. See A Stephan ‘Why morality should be excluded from the cartel criminalisation debate’
(2012) 3(1) New J Eur Crim L 126–237; C Harding ‘Business collusion as a criminological
phenomenon: exploring the global criminalisation of business cartels’ (2006) 14 Crit Crim
181; A MacCulloch ‘The cartel offence and the criminalisation of UK competition law’ [2003]
J Bus L 615. It is also notable that Mill argued that the criminal law should only concern itself
with behaviour that harms others: JS Mill On Liberty (Oxford: Oxford World’s Classics, 1998
– ﬁrst published 1859).
69. For an excellent discussion of these, seeWhelan, above n 33, p 27, citing the examples ofW
Wils ‘Is criminalization of EU competition law the answer?’ in K Cseres, MP Schinkel and F
Vogelaar (eds) Criminalization of Competition Law Enforcement: Economic and Legal
Implications for the EU Member States (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006); T Clavani ‘Cartel
penalties and damages in Ireland: criminalization and the case for custodial sentences’ in Cseres
et al, ibid; Stephan, above n 15; D Ginsburg and J Wright ‘Antitrust sanctions’ (2010) 6(2)
Competition Pol’y Int’l 187.
70. See A Stephan and A Nikpay ‘Leniency decision-making from a corporate perspective:
complex realities’ in C Beaton-Wells and C Tran (eds) Anti-Cartel Enforcement in a
Contemporary Age: The Leniency Religion (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015).
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a cross-section of the business community in Australia, found that the process that is
likely to surround any decision to form a cartel is far more complicated than is generally
assumed in deterrence theory.71 The study also suggested that the deterrent effect of
incarceration may be exaggerated.72
Arguments based solely on social harm are also problematic, because cartel laws
make little or no attempt to quantify the harm caused. In fact, they punish infringements
regardless of their effect or even the extent to which they were actually implemented.
Unlike theft or fraud, the harm caused is not always obvious either. It amounts to an
increase in price to a level higher than would otherwise be the case, but it can be tricky
to distinguish the overcharge from legitimate reasons why the price might have gone up
during the relevant period (eg increased costs).73 Moreover, most cartels appear to be
motivated – in part at least – by a crisis in the industry or fear of bankruptcy.74 Not only
does this make it less likely that cartelists behave rationally; it also risks skewing the
moral responsibility for their actions, as price ﬁxing out of greed becomes price ﬁxing
out of fear of losing one’s livelihood. However, this does not change the means by
which a cartel outcome is achieved (Robin Hood stole regardless of his good
intentions), nor the harmful effects to consumers.75
Conscious of these shortcomings and unsatisﬁed with the harm and deterrence-based
arguments for cartel criminalisation, a number of academics have sought to formulate
normative justiﬁcations. The ﬁrst of these argues that the moral offensiveness of cartel
conduct is heightened by their characteristic determination to defy the prohibition and
take steps to avoid detection. Harding and Joshua argue that the act of hiding their
actions from customers, the authorities and others within the ﬁrm creates a ‘spiral of
delinquency’, since it is not simply the anti-competitive behaviour in itself, but also
the determination to defy the prohibition that contributes to a heightened perception
of delinquent behaviour.76 The further cartelists go to hide their behaviour, the greater
the spiral of delinquency. Cartels typically go as far as to meet in secret locations, use
codenames and communicate through unregistered mobile phones and private email
accounts.77 The moral wrongfulness therefore arises not only from the act of price
ﬁxing itself, but from the fact it is hidden. Indeed, it is hard to think of a legitimate
reason why a cartelist might take such drastic steps to conceal their behaviour other than
a good understanding that it is illegal. This argument is particularly relevant to the UK’s
revised cartel offence, discussed in the previous section, but it relates more to deliberate
rule breaking than the immoral nature of the act itself.
71. C Beaton-Wells and C Parker ‘Justifying criminal sanctions for cartel conduct: a hard case’
(2013) 1(1) J Antitrust Enforcement 198.
72. Ibid.
73. See Oxera Quantifying Antitrust Damages: Towards Non-binding Guidance for Courts,
study prepared for the European Commission (December 2009), available at http://ec.europa.
eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/quantiﬁcation_study.pdf (accessed 20 December
2016).
74. A Stephan ‘Price ﬁxing during a recession: implications of an economic downturn for
cartels and enforcement’ (2012) 35(3) World Competition 511–528.
75. See discussion by Whelan, above n 33, pp 92–95.
76. C Harding ‘The anti-cartel enforcement industry: criminological perspectives on cartel
criminalisation’ (2006) 14 Crit Crim 181; Harding and Joshua, above n 6, p 51.
77. A Stephan ‘See no evil: cartels and the limits of antitrust compliance programs’ (2010)
31(8) The Company Lawyer 231–239.
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The second of these focuses on the act of price ﬁxing as a form of cheating.
MacCulloch points out that the ‘criminal trial is inherently a “moral space” where …
the guilty are punished because of their wrongdoing – it is the actions of the accused,
their wrongdoing, which is judged’.78 He suggests that the two most convincing
conceptions for highlighting the wrong in cartel behaviour are ‘cheating’79 and what
Beaton-Wells and Fisse describe as the ‘subversion of competition’,80 which we might
think of as being equivalent to insider trading. MacCulloch contends that.
Both represent the concern that cartel behaviour is wrong in that the act of making or
implementing a cartel arrangement denies the marketplace of the legitimate
expectation of a competitive process. The cartelist ‘subverts’ that process or ‘cheats’
the marketplace by stepping outside of the legitimate process that other market
players, and the wider economy, legitimately expect. The wrong in the conduct is that
the cartel members have chosen to break the rules of the game.’81
This is consistent with the work of Stuart Green, who also rejects the idea that pure
deterrence or harm-prevention arguments can justify criminalisation.82 Instead, he
argues that ‘moral wrongfulness’ of practices like insider trading can be found in
existing moral norms, such as deception and cheating.83 Like Harding and Joshua,
Green also suggests that the source of moral content is not only the underlying act,
but the intentional violation, concealment and deﬁance of the law.84
Wardhaugh takes the cheating argument a step further, arguing that cartel harm
strikes at a valuable institution that provides an individual with the ability to secure
his own welfare in a liberal society.85 He does this by drawing on the works of JSMill86
and J Rawls.87 Wardhaugh argues that because cartels undermine ‘an important social
institution, namely the market’, cartel activity can legitimately be criminalised. He
views the market as an instrument of distributive justice. This allows for a normative
justiﬁcation of cartel criminalisation that does not make the additional inference that
harms to all social institutions should be subject to criminal sanctions.88 The argument
is therefore that criminalisation can be justiﬁed on the grounds that cartelists fail to ‘play
by the rules’ of the marketplace and that they ‘carve out a self-exception to the general
social rules governing distributive justice’.89 This is a very convincing argument, if
indeed it is the case that members of the public value the rules of the market in this way.
78. MacCulloch, above n 48.
79. SP Green Lying, Cheating and Stealing: A Moral Theory of White Collar Crime (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006); and C Beaton-Wells ‘Capturing the criminality of hard core
cartels: the Australian proposal’ (2007) 31 Melbourne U L Rev 675.
80. C Beaton-Wells and B Fisse Australian Cartel Regulation: Law, Policy and Practice in an
International Context (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
81. MacCulloch, above n 48, p 85; see also Lever and Pike, above n 65.
82. Green, above n 79.
83. See Green, above n 34, at 1551, discussed in Whelan, above n 31, pp 5–6.
84. Ibid, pp 1603–1535.
85. B Wardhaugh Cartels, Markets and Crime: A Normative Justiﬁcation for the
Criminalisation of Economic Collusion (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014),
Chapter 1; B Wardhaugh ‘A normative approach to the criminalisation of cartel activity’
(2012) 32 Legal Stud 369.
86. JS Mill On Liberty (London: Parker, 1859).
87. J Rawls A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1999).
88. Wardhaugh, n 88, pp 49–51.
89. Ibid, p 49.
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The third argument is made byWhelan and focuses on whether there is a strong basis
for cartel criminalisation in retribution theory.90 This suggests that punishment should
arise where individuals have made choices that society deems wrong, rather than
focusing on the prevention of future crime.91 Whelan discusses possible sources for
the moral wrongfulness of cartel conduct, looking ﬁrst at stealing. He points out that,
while cartels clearly result in higher prices, the ownership of the overcharge could be
questioned. Like Wardhaugh, he suggests that this could be overcome not through a
legal deﬁnition of ownership, but by the presumption that arises out of the ‘endorsement
of free market economics by European citizens’, which gives rise to consumers’ ‘right
to a competitive market’.92 He also points out that such a presumption is consistent with
competition law’s emphasis on consumer welfare.93 It may also be found in consumers’
right to obtain compensation where they have been victims of cartel overcharging.94
However, it is not easy to reconcile these considerations with the ﬁrm’s ownership over
its proﬁts. Indeed, a ﬁrm engaged in price ﬁxing can be said to be maximising its proﬁts,
rather than intending to permanently deprive consumers of their money.
Turning next to deception, Whelan ﬁnds that situations where a cartelist expressly
tells their customer they are price ﬁxing, and where they falsely tell their customer they
are not, are straightforward.95 The ﬁrst is not deceptive, while the second clearly is. The
latter is easily observed in the case of bid-rigging, because participants are being asked
to take part in the explicitly competitive process of submitting an independent bid. So
the submission of a false bid or an arrangement through which the winning bid has been
90. Whelan, above n 33, ch 4 andWhelan, above n 31; he employs a tripartite framework set out
by the American legal theorist Green and involves culpability (the state of mind of the defendant),
social harmfulness (the consequences of the conduct) and moral wrongfulness (the conduct in
question violates a moral norm). Green does not suggest that these act as a set of necessary
conditions for criminalisation, but only as a framework to help us understand the complexity
of white collar crime: S Green ‘Moral ambiguity in white collar criminal law’ (2004) 18 Notre
Dame J L Ethics & Pub Pol’y 501.
91. See H Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968).
92. Whelan, above n 31, p 10.
93. Consumer and producer welfare concern the distribution of wealth or proﬁt in an economy
between those selling a product and those buying it. Many economists contend that it is the total
welfare in the market that is important, and that the way in which competition policy is aimed at
maximising consumer welfare can actually reduce welfare in some markets. They argue that the
fact that a total welfare standard results in more wealth transfers from consumers is mitigated by
the fact that any extra proﬁts enjoyed by the ﬁrm will beneﬁt shareholders and employees (who
are also consumers) and allow the ﬁrm to better innovate and expand. This is a separate question
to cartel harm, which is generally detrimental to welfare in the market regardless of whether there
is an emphasis on consumer or total welfare. Contrast DW Carlton ‘Does antitrust need to be
modernized?’ (2007) 21(3) J Econ Perspectives 155–176 with R Pittman ‘Consumer surplus as
the appropriate standard for antitrust enforcement’ (2007) 3 Competition Pol’y Int’l 205. In
addition, under Art 101(3), in order to gain an exception from a breach of Art 101(1), a ﬁrm must
demonstrate that any countervailing efﬁciencies that arise out of the arrangement beneﬁt
consumers.
94. Directive 2014/104/EY of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November
2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of
the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union [2014]; Case
C-453/99, Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297 and joined cases C-295/04 to
C-298/04, Vincenzo Manfredi and others v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni Spa and others
[2006] ECR I-6619.
95. Whelan, above n 31, pp 16–21.
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decided in advance by the bidders is clearly deceptive and, one might suggest, morally
repugnant. However, many cartels fall into a third, more problematic, scenario. This is
where the cartelist is silent as to whether they are price ﬁxing. Here, deception can only
exist if there is a strong positive presumption that ﬁrms behave competitively in a free
market. Cartels typically involve efforts to hide their activities. One might argue that
this secrecy gives rise to a false belief among consumers,96 but again that only holds
true if consumers accept and expect a competitive norm.Whelan also considers whether
cartels break a moral norm against cheating one’s customers, but ﬁnds difﬁculty in
identifying the ‘unfair advantage’ that the cartelist intends to obtain.
The key issue underpinning the strength of these normative arguments in support of
criminalisation is the extent to which ordinary people expect markets to be competitive
and recognise the harmful nature of cartels. In particular, these statements must hold
true if cartels do indeed ‘break the rules of the game’, strike at an ‘important social
institution’ (the competitive market) or amount to a deception even where no false
statements have been made. In relation to his retribution arguments, Whelan states that.
For a cartel activity to have a negative impact, one must demonstrate a positive
feature of the counterfactual: one must demonstrate that a free market is valued by
society …. The strength of a retribution-based criminalization argument therefore
depends upon the acceptance by society of the value of the free market.97
He then goes on to survey various public attitudes studies examining whether members
of the public prefer the free market. In particular, the 2003 PewGlobal Attitudes Project
that found that 33 of 44 countries surveyed felt that people are better off if they live in a
free market economy.98 But he concludes that a lack of empirical evidence directly
relating to cartels is a particular weakness in the existing literature.99 Harding and
Joshua suggest it is not unreasonable to assume that competitive prices are the norm
and are expected by consumers, but no previously published empirical studies directly
deal with this question.100
3. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ON PUBLIC ATTITUDES AND CARTEL
CRIMINALISATION
This paper now turns to the empirical ﬁndings on the attitudes and perceptions of cartels
among ordinary members of the public. These are important in helping us to investigate
the criminalisation question in a number of respects. First, they allow us to test the
hypothesis that consumers expect markets to be competitive and for separate
undertakings to set their prices independently of each other. These questions are key
to both dealing with the over-criminalisation criticisms and lending support to the
normative justiﬁcations for a cartel offence – in particular, arguments that cartel
conduct amounts to a moral wrong (regardless of harm or deterrence) even where there
96. This was argued in Lever and Pike, above n 65, at 95 and accepted by the High Court in the
extradition case: Norris v Government of the USA [2007] EWHC 71 (Admin), [2007] 1 WLR
1730.
97. Whelan, above n 33, p 92.
98. Pew Global Attitudes Project Views of a Changing World, Second Major Report of the
Pew Global Attitudes Project (June 2003).
99. Whelan, above n 33, p 103.
100. Harding and Joshua, above n 6, ch 2.3.
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is no explicit deception. Secondly, they help us understand the extent to which there is
popular condemnation of cartel conduct, the level of stigma attached to it and the
severity of punishment that is thought appropriate.
The empirical study consisted of four public surveys carried out online between 27
June and 15 July 2014, in the UK, Germany, Italy and the US.101 These were designed,
translated and piloted within the University of East Anglia’s Centre for Competition
Policy, with the assistance of a number of competition law academics from each of
the subject jurisdictions.102 The ﬁeldwork was done by YouGov PLC in the UK,
Germany and the US, and in cooperation with Research Now in Italy. The sample
was selected from online panels typically used for election polls and general market
research. These samples were selected to be representative of the general population
in each country according to a list of demographic characteristics. The sample sizes
were 2,509 (UK), 2,648 (Germany), 2,521 (Italy) and 2,913 (USA). These surveys were
actually a follow-up of a 2007 study carried out only in the UK, which asked a variety of
questions relating to price ﬁxing.103
The decision to undertake a comparative study was motivated by a desire to see
whether different cultures and levels of enforcement have resulted in diverging public
attitudes. The US was included because it has by far the most active criminal antitrust
enforcement regime in the world. Germany and Italy were selected so that attitudes in
the UK could be compared with those of other EU Member States.104 Any signiﬁcant
divergence in opinion within the EU would be signiﬁcant, because the most harmful
multinational cartels are dealt with by the European Commission under the EU’s purely
civil enforcement regime.
3.1 Do consumers expect independent pricing?
Respondents in the study were not given any information about how cartels are treated in
law or of the dominant view among academics and policy makers, that such practices are
overwhelmingly harmful and should be prohibited. Care was also taken in the question
ordering, to limit the scope for information contained in earlier questions inﬂuencing
responses later in the survey. The survey began with two general introductory questions
about markets, including one about government intervention (Figure 1).
The responses were broadly what one would expect, reﬂecting a stronger faith in the
free market among Americans, as compared to more sceptical Europeans. Within
Europe, one can see the more neoliberal leanings of the British and Germans as
compared to Italians. Before being asked whether cartel conduct was harmful or should
be punished, respondents were asked about their expectations of how competing
101. The study was funded by the Centre for Competition Policy, with money awarded to it by
the Economic and Social Research Council (UK).
102. For a full list of these and more detail on the methodology, see A Stephan ‘Survey of
public attitudes to price ﬁxing in the UK, Germany, Italy and the USA’ CCP Working Paper
15-8, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2642181 (accessed 23
September 2016). Questions generally gave respondents two alternative options and they were
asked to indicate which they agreed with more.
103. This study was cited in the UK’s decision to reform the cartel offence under the Enterprise
and Regulatory Reform Act 2013. See BIS, A Competition Regime for Growth, above n 47. The
results of the 2007 study can be found in A Stephan ‘Survey of public attitudes to price ﬁxing and
cartel enforcement in Britain’ (2008) 5(1) Competition L Rev 123–145.
104. At the time of writing, the UK had held a referendum in which a majority of the population
chose to leave the EU, but the UK is still at this time a full EU Member State.
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businesses set their prices (Figure 2). This question is very signiﬁcant for the purposes
of this paper, and it is important to stress that respondents had no information about
price ﬁxing, its treatment in law or the harm it can cause.
For the purposes of the criminalisation debate discussed above, this question
provides a very signiﬁcant set of results. Around two thirds of respondents in the
UK, Germany and Italy expect competitors to set their prices independently of each
other. Less than one in three felt that it was normal for competing businesses to talk
Figure 1: Government intervention in markets [Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Figure 2: Expectations about how businesses set prices [Colour ﬁgure can be viewed
at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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to each other about prices (one in ﬁve in the UK). These results suggest that consumers
are far from indifferent to the way in which ﬁrms calculate their prices, with two key
implications. The ﬁrst is that there appears to be a competitive norm in each of these
countries. Indeed, members of the public both expect businesses to set their prices
independently of each other, and object to them talking to each other about the prices
they charge. This appears to lend support to Wardhaugh’s assertion about the market
as an important social institution and the way in which citizens value it. If the norm
is for markets to be competitive, then it is easier to characterise cartels as subverting
the ‘rules of the game’. Interestingly, the proportion of people expecting independent
pricing was lower in the US, despite Americans’ more favourable view of the free
market. This could reﬂect how perceptions are primarily shaped by notions of fairness
or an awareness of the harm that results from competitors colluding on price (discussed
below). Whatever the main driver, ordinary members of the public appear to value and
expect the process of competition.
The second implication is that where competing ﬁrms depart from the competitive
process to form a cartel, most consumers will continue to rely on the assumption that
prices are being calculated independently, unless told otherwise by the ﬁrms. This
may very well constitute an empirical basis for arguing that attempts to hide or suppress
the disclosure of information about the existence of a cartel amount to deception, in the
way that Whelan describes. It also helps us to deal with the problematic scenario of a
cartel that fails to inform customers of its existence but makes no false statements or
attempts at positive deception. The clear expectation of independent pricing arguably
makes such a cartel objectionable, in the same vein as deliberate misrepresentations
or the submission of a rigged bid. It also suggests that the UK’s decision to reform
its cartel offence around ‘openness’ is far from ﬂawed.105 If we know that consumers
expect competitive pricing and object to collusion, then the clandestine act of price
ﬁxing is immoral, both as a deception and as an act of delinquency (to use Harding
and Joshua’s term), in deliberately engaging in unlawful behaviour that is hidden.
3.2 How objectionable is price ﬁxing?
The study then turned to views on cartel conduct. The phrase ‘price ﬁxing’ was not
initially used. Instead, respondents were given an introductory question that set out a
simple scenario involving two corner shops. They were asked whether they thought it
was good or bad for those corner shops to meet up once a month and agree the prices they
charge for groceries. Around two thirds of respondents (almost three quarters in the UK
and Germany) felt it was bad. Those who expected prices to be calculated independently
mapped very strongly on to this group, with a signiﬁcant proportion of those not
expecting independent pricing recognising the negative effects when presented with a
speciﬁc scenario. Respondents were then asked a direct question about price ﬁxing.
This question introduces the phrase ‘price ﬁxing’ and asks whether it is harmful and
should be punished (Figure 3). We see respondents from the previous questions
answering consistently, with an increase in the majority who are hostile to cartel
behaviour. In this question, some of the increase may be due to negative connotations
surrounding the phrase ‘price ﬁxing’ and the fact the question mentions punishment. It
may also be due to their developing a better understanding of the conduct being
examined in these surveys. Nonetheless, a clear majority of respondents in each of
the four jurisdictions recognise that price ﬁxing is harmful to customers and feel that
105. Whelan, above n 48.
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it is deserving of punishment. It is important to bear in mind that respondents had no
information about how price ﬁxing was actually treated, in law, in their jurisdiction
or anywhere else.
Later in the survey, each respondent was asked, ‘As far as you are aware, is it illegal
in your country for competing businesses to meet up and agree on what prices to charge
their customers?’Only 53% of Britons and Italians thought price ﬁxing was illegal and,
surprisingly, only 41% of Americans. The proportion in Germany was signiﬁcantly
higher (75%), but this may have been due to a number of high-proﬁle cases that
occurred in Germany over the 6-week period immediately preceding the ﬁeldwork.106
So in the UK, Italy and the USA, a signiﬁcant proportion of respondents believe that
price ﬁxing is harmful and should attract punishment, despite not being aware that it
is in fact illegal in their country. This is signiﬁcant because it means the perceptions
of many respondents were not shaped by their knowledge that cartel conduct was
unlawful. They reasoned that cartels are harmful and should be punished despite the
law. The fact that the lowest awareness of the law was among citizens of the most active
cartel enforcement jurisdiction in the world suggests that enforcement has had very
limited educative effect. Criminal law there is not pulling itself up by its own
‘bootstraps’ in just the way Jones and Williams warn. However, poor knowledge of
the law does not necessarily mean weak support for criminal sanctions.
In order to determine how objectionable consumers felt price ﬁxing was, the surveys
turned to questions about sanctions and comparisons with other, better known, forms of
wrongdoing. Those respondents who felt price ﬁxing was harmful and should be
punished were ﬁrst asked what forms of punishment they agreed with in relation to
the ﬁrm. They were given the option to choose as many as they wanted from a list of
three (public naming and shaming, a ﬁne at least equal to the illegal cartel proﬁts and
106. ‘Five German brewers ﬁned €106.5 m for price-ﬁxing’ Financial Times 13 January 2014;
‘German sausage cartel caught bangers to rights’ The Guardian 15 July 2014; ‘German cartel
inquiry launched into Deutsche Bahn’ Financial Times 30 January 2014.
Figure 3: Price-ﬁxing [Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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compensation to customers who had been overcharged) or were given the option to
indicate that they felt none of these were appropriate.
Figure 4 shows how there was strong support for all three of these – especially in the
UK. One might interpret these results as an indication that price ﬁxing is viewed as
being serious enough to warrant more than simply a remedy that restores the status
quo, absent the cartel. In particular, strong support for public naming and shaming, in
addition to a ﬁne and compensation, suggests popular support for a punitive approach
to tackling cartels, not a purely regulatory one. Only a very small number felt that none
of the three options was appropriate. The same group of respondents were then asked
what forms of punishment they felt were appropriate for the individuals responsible.
The options were public naming and shaming, a personal ﬁne, a ban from holding
senior managerial positions and imprisonment.
While there is strong support for the ﬁrst three sanctions (in particular, a personal ﬁne
and a disqualiﬁcation order), the limits to people’s willingness to condemn cartel
behaviour become apparent in relation to imprisonment. If taken as a proportion of
the entire sample (not just those who feel that price ﬁxing should be punished), support
for the imprisonment of cartelists stands at around one in ﬁve in the UK, Germany and
Italy and around one in four in the US. This may reﬂect an absence of the clear sense
of moral stigma associated with traditional crime. However, relatively weak support
for imprisonment does not necessarily mean that cartel conduct should not be
treated as a crime. Moreover, the ﬁgure of 27% support for imprisonment in the UK
(in Figure 5) was only 11% in the 2007 study, when the question was put to a similar
subset of respondents. This amounts to more than a doubling in support for
imprisonment in the space of 7 years. It might be explained by greater general
awareness of competition issues through the advocacy work of the OFT/CMA or it
may simply reﬂect a greater hostility towards corporate wrongdoing following the
ﬁnancial crisis in late 2007–8.
The same group of respondents were then asked to think about how serious or
objectionable price ﬁxing was compared to other forms of wrongdoing. These ranged
from traditional offences like theft and assault, to other forms of business wrongdoing,
such as tax evasion and insider trading. The aggregate results across the four
jurisdictions are set out in Figure 6.
Figure 4: Appropriate sanctions for the ﬁrm [Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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Unsurprisingly, respondents felt strongly that offences resulting in physical harm
(assault, drink driving, misleading consumers about product safety) were signiﬁcantly
more serious than price ﬁxing. The key comparisons were with theft, fraud and other
forms of ﬁnancial crime. Respondents were fairly split on whether theft was more
serious or about the same as price ﬁxing, and the results were similar in relation to
corporate tax evasion. But when asked to compare with fraud, a clear majority of
respondents in all jurisdictions except Italy felt that price ﬁxing was about as serious
(around 40% felt that it was less serious). The results were similar in relation to insider
trading too. However, for all of these offences, the net results indicated that price ﬁxing
was viewed as less objectionable than any of these offences. Indeed, price ﬁxing was
only viewed as being signiﬁcantly more serious than copyright theft.
On the one hand, we might interpret these results as reﬂecting a weak moral
opprobrium in relation to price ﬁxing among large sections of the population in each
of the four jurisdictions. Yet they may simply reﬂect how the above-mentioned offences
are better known and how the harm they cause is better understood. A key problem in
competition law enforcement is effective dissemination of information and increasing
public awareness of the harm caused by anti-competitive conduct. As this tends to be
passed on and shared among a large number of ﬁnal consumers, it is often hard to
identify a critical mass of harm or a clear group of victims.107 This lack of awareness
is reﬂected in the above results on whether respondents thought that price ﬁxing was
illegal, and in the fact that US attitudes appear to be no more hardened than those in
Europe, despite it being by far the most active criminal cartel enforcement regime in
the world. It is also notable that research undertaken by the CMA shows that as many
as three quarters of businesses in the UK (albeit mainly small and medium-sized ﬁrms)
have either never heard of competition law or describe their familiarity with it as
107. See generally A Stephan ‘Cartel criminalisation: the role of the media in the “battle for
hearts and minds”’ in Beaton-Wells and Ezrachi, above n 11.
Figure 5: Appropriate sanctions for the individual [Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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poor.108 One might suggest that these results would be different if there were greater
public awareness of the extent of cartel harm.
CONCLUSION
This paper ﬁlls an important gap in the literature on cartel criminalisation by providing
cross-jurisdictional empirical evidence on how consumers expect sellers of goods and
services to have calculated their prices, and the extent to which ordinary members of the
108. CMA UK Businesses’ Understanding of Competition Law, report prepared for CMA by
IFF Research (26 March 2015), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/ﬁle/429876/UK_businesses__understanding_of_competition_law_-
_report.pdf (accessed 20 December 2016).
Figure 6: Comparison with other crime and wrongdoing (average across the four
countries) [Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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public feel that price ﬁxing is objectionable. Its ﬁndings suggest that there is empirical
backing for the normative justiﬁcations for cartel criminalisation, without the need to
rely solely on harm and deterrence arguments. In particular, there is a clear expectation
among ordinary members of the public that competing businesses calculate their prices
independently of each other. Therefore, cartel arrangements that allow competing ﬁrms
to act like monopolists go against what is generally expected by citizens in a free market
economy. It follows that cartels subvert a competitive norm expected of markets, and
that consumers will continue to assume that prices are independent unless they are told
otherwise.
The survey results strengthen each of the normative arguments for cartel
criminalisation. Under Harding and Joshua’s ‘spiral of delinquency’, clandestine cartel
arrangements are not only objectionable because they constitute deliberate, hidden rule
breaking. They are also a hidden divergence from what is expected by consumers in the
market. This aspect of the ﬁndings also ﬁts in with arguments made byMacCulloch and
by Beaton-Wells and Fisse, about the subversion of competition and the way in which
cartels deny the marketplace the legitimate expectation of a competitive process.
However, it is Wardhaugh and Whelan’s arguments that are to a signiﬁcant extent
vindicated by these results.
The fact that ordinary members of the public value the competitive process and
understand that cartel arrangements will result in higher prices supports Wardhaugh’s
characterisation of cartels as undermining an important social institution. The results
are consistent with the idea that competition amounts to a ‘social rule governing
distributive justice’, especially as the popular understanding of collusive practices is
condemnatory despite some confusion as to whether cartels are actually illegal. The
expectation that markets are competitive and the implication that they are therefore
valued by society also provides a basis for Whelan’s retribution-based criminalisation
argument, relating to deception. Even in a situation where competitors are silent as to
the existence of a cartel arrangement, the fact that most consumers will continue to
wrongly assume that prices are competitive may amount to a deception. Where the
cartel makes explicit misrepresentations to customers (eg customers are told that prices
are increasing because of costs, or where a rigged bid is submitted in a tender process),
the moral offensiveness of the conduct is simply heightened. The absence of these
aggravating factors does not make their behaviour neutral or absolve them of moral
culpability.
The study therefore goes some way in helping to establish what is morally
reprehensible about cartel conduct. Combined with the very signiﬁcant social harm
caused by cartels (which is generally not disputed), this may provide a sound
justiﬁcation for labelling cartel conduct as crime. Yet, the results and normative
arguments presented above do not defeat the critics of cartel criminalisation completely.
In particular, the comparatively weak attitudes and poor levels of awareness of the law
in the US, despite it being the oldest and most active criminal cartel enforcement regime
in the world, suggest that criminal offences may indeed be ineffective at pulling
themselves up by ‘their own bootstraps’. In addition, when asked to compare price
ﬁxing to other forms of wrongdoing, while many viewed it as comparable to other more
established forms of wrongdoing, for many it was less objectionable. The relatively
weak support for the imprisonment of individuals is also signiﬁcant here, although in
the UK that appears to have increased signiﬁcantly since 2007. The weak level of
support for imprisonment is also problematic because the sanctions that do enjoy strong
public support (corporate ﬁnes, individual ﬁnes, private damages and director
disqualiﬁcations) can be administered effectively through a purely civil enforcement
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regime. Only deterrence arguments can counter this point, highlighting how the threat
of sanctions other than imprisonment are of limited effectiveness.109
Critics such as Williams also suggest that successfully drawing parallels between
cartel conduct and more established criminal offences ‘does not provide sufﬁcient
justiﬁcation for criminalisation’.110 For them, the sanctity of criminal law demands that
many categories of corporate wrongdoing be dealt with under civil law only. In reality,
neither the criminal or civil law categories are entirely satisfactory – indeed, one could
question whether there is a well-delineated notion of what ‘criminalisation’ actually
means or the criteria against which it is judged.111 In Europe, competition law
enforcement is unmistakably punitive in nature, yet competition authorities have the
power to directly impose very signiﬁcant penalties that are administrative only in name.
By contrast, the US has been successfully pressing on with its high level of criminal
cartel enforcement, more than a century after it was originally introduced, despite
popular perceptions of cartel conduct that are actually weaker than in Europe. Indeed,
it appears that Baker may have been mistaken when he noted, ‘what seems to
distinguish the US is public willingness – almost without debate – to treat individuals
who participate in cartels as serious criminals who should be treated in the same way
as embezzlers, stock swindlers and other economic thieves’.112
Nevertheless, the results make it harder to argue that cartel conduct is morally
ambiguous or neutral. The study shows that most ordinary members of the public feel
that price ﬁxing is serious enough to deserve punitive sanctions of some sort. Moreover,
the apparently weak educative effect of enforcement, combined with the fact that
respondents were not told how cartels are treated in law, makes the ﬁndings all the more
signiﬁcant. Overall, the results were surprisingly similar across the four jurisdictions
despite big differences in enforcement and culture. This may suggest that the views
captured in the study were primarily informed by a sense of fairness derived from
citizens’ experiences as consumers and from personal judgements about what is right
and wrong.
The fact that, on average, price ﬁxing is viewed as being less serious than other types
of corporate wrongdoing may simply reﬂect a natural tendency for respondents to place
greater importance on the categories of wrongdoing with which they are more familiar.
In fact, research shows how public perceptions of crime are skewed by media reporting
and its preoccupation with certain types of offences.113 Indeed, one might suggest that
public perceptions of cartels are capable of signiﬁcantly greater moral opprobrium, if
there was better education about these practices.
109. Corporate ﬁnes and damages largely impact shareholders, and individual ﬁnes or director
disqualiﬁcation can either be indemniﬁed or circumvented through inventive employment
arrangements. The reputational damage caused by civil enforcement may also be very limited.
This is because many cartels are organised by upstream ﬁrms that sell to other businesses and
because the very characteristics that make the cartel possible (few competitors and no substitutes
to the product in question) mean that customers have no choice but to continue purchasing the
product: see Whelan, above n 33, pp 75–78.
110. Williams, above n 58, p 301, citing J FeinbergHarmless Wrongdoing: TheMoral Limits of
the Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988) vol 4, p 176.
111. Lacey, above n 34, p 942.
112. Baker, above n 11, p 27.
113. R Reiner ‘Media made criminality: the representation of crime in the mass media’ in R
Reiner, M Maguire and R Morgan (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Criminology (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002) pp 302–340.
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While the ﬁndings of this paper further the normative justiﬁcations for cartel
criminalisation, they are unlikely to convince those concerned about ‘over-
criminalisation’. In particular, they may not provide an entirely satisfactory response
to the question of what distinguishes cartel conduct as deserving of criminal liability,
as compared to other forms of anti-competitive behaviour. Within the context of cartels,
the UK approach of deﬁning criminal liability around an absence of ‘openness’ is
consistent with the results of this paper and the normative justiﬁcations to which they
relate. Openness also helps to distinguish other forms of competition harm, such as
abuse of dominance (by ﬁrms with high market power) and attempts at anti-competitive
mergers, which are generally observable in a way that concealed cartel conduct is not.
The ﬁndings and arguments contained in this paper have helped strengthen the
normative basis for criminal sanctions against cartels. Coupled with the level of social
harm caused by them and the deterrence arguments, there exists a very sound
justiﬁcation for countries wishing to criminalise their cartel laws. However, these need
to be complemented by public awareness and educational programmes, so that the full
extent and nature of cartel harm is better understood. There is a clear movement towards
cartel criminalisation globally and the main obstacles are not the lack of normative
justiﬁcations, but the various practical, institutional and procedural challenges
surrounding the use of criminal sanctions in competition law, which are not explored
in this paper.114 The success of cartel criminalisation will ultimately depend more on
how well these challenges can be overcome than on the question of moral justiﬁcation.
The continued growth of criminal law in regulating the behaviour of the individual and
the ﬁrm shows little sign of receding.
114. See eg A Stephan ‘Four key challenges to the successful criminalisation of cartel laws’
(2014) 2(2) J Antitrust Enforcement 305–332.
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